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restriction was out of step with the times.2 Removal of the trustee
designated by the testator will often be more of a subversion of his
intent than altering the trust in other ways. And, as the principal
case indicates, in some circumstances the appointment of substituted
trustees might effectively destroy the main purpose of the trust.
If a state-supported college or university were to receive a
bequest providing scholarships for "white" students only, the Girard
case indicates clearly that the university, being an arm of the state,
could not administer such a trust without violating the fourteenth
amendment. If it be found that the testator intended primarily to
benefit the university by his bequest and that the university refused
to co-operate with a substituted trustee, the principal case seems to
offer a workable and equitable solution. A college receiving a
bequest establishing a trust restricted to a particular race or religion
which it cannot legally or in good conscience administer, should not
to be forced to choose between repudiating it altogether or accepting
it as is, if it may do so at all. Ultimately the problem is resolved
into a balancing of two interests thus brought into conflict: the
interest of the college and the public in making the college's facilities
available to qualified students without regard to race or religion, and
the interest of the testator in the unfettered right to dispose of his
property as he sees fit. 7  In most cases the former should outweigh
the latter, for the advancement of learning and the protection of civil
liberties would seem to be more worthy goals than blind respect
for the supposed intent of the dead hand.
JOSEPH STEVENS FERRELL
Constitutional Law-Inadmissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence
in State Criminal Proceedings
In a recent decision' the United States Supreme Court held that
" See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will
of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957), and Notes cited in notes 13 and
17 szpra.
27 See note 21 supra.
1Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). (Justice Stewart concurred in
result only.) Cleveland police officers, having information that a person
wanted for questioning about some bombings was hiding out in defendant's
home, broke into defendant's home, waving a piece of paper which they
claimed was a warrant, and thoroughly searched the house. During this
search they found the obscene materials, for the possession of which the
defendant, Mrs. Dollree Mapp, was convicted under the provisions of OHIo
REV. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1961). On trial no search warrant was pro-
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evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure by state law enforce-
ment officers was inadmissible in a state criminal proceeding. In so
holding the Court expressly overruled Wolf v. Colorado2 which had
definitively established the admissibility of such evidence.
For over fifty years controversy as to whether such evidence
should be admitted has raged incessantly. The many inconsistencies
to be found in the cases with respect to this issue are possibly attrib-
utable to the great difficulty in choosing between the two conflicting
values involved: the right to privacy, and the ever-increasing need
for effective law enforcement.'
At common law, any evidence that was competent and relevant
was admissible.4 The view that illegally obtained evidence should
be excluded first arose in 1886 in Boyd v. United States.5 In this
case the Court struck down an act of Congress which provided that
in a revenue case the defendant's failure to produce certain docu-
ments when ordered to do so would result in an irrebuttable presump-
tion that the government's allegations were true. The Court con-
cluded that the act was contrary to the fourth amendment and to the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment, although not literally
within the prohibition of either.6 Twenty-eight years later in Weeks
v. United States7 the Court formulated what is now known as the
federal exclusionary rule.8 The Court held that evidence seized
from the petitioner's house by a United States Marshal acting with-
out a warrant was inadmissible in federal courts. The government
argued the common law rule and contended that the evidence was
both competent and relevant. In rejecting this argument the Court
stated that the right of citizens "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures"' was a mere form of words if evidence gathered through
duced, nor was the failure to do so explained by the prosecution. It appeared
that there never was a warrant.2338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'See generally Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,
and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. RV. 1 (1950).
'8 WIGmom, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8 "And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself." Id. at 633.
'232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'Now embodied in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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such illegal action by federal officers could be used against them.10
The rule of the Weeks case has been followed unwaveringly in
federal criminal prosecutions."
In 1948, Wolf v. Colorado2 presented a different problem to
the Court: does the Weeks rule operate in a state trial so as to
exclude evidence gained by an unreasonable search and seizure by
state officers? The Court held that it did not. Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for the majority, stated,
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in
"the concept of ordered society" and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause.'"
The Court pointed out, however, that the means of enforcing the
right were up to the several states. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Black stated that the exclusionary rule "is not a command of
the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence
which Congress might negate."' Although attacked periodically,
the Wolf rule has been affirmed in subsequent decisions. 15
0 "If letters and documents can thus be seized and held and used in evi-
dence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such search and seizure
is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be striken from the Constitution." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393
(1914).
"United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313(1921) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
12338 U.S. 25 (1949).
13 Id. at 27-28.
"id. at 39, 40.
"1In Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 17 (1951), the petitioner, relying on
Wolf for the proposition that an illegal search and seizure by state officers
violated the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment, sought a
federal injunction against the use in the state court of the seized evidence.
The Court upheld the lower court's refusal to grant the injunction, pointing
out that under Wolf the states can choose to admit or exclude such evidence,
and expressing the Court's reluctance to interfere in state proceedings. Later
by a five-to-four decision in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), the
Court did enjoin a federal agent, who had seized evidence under an invalid
warrant issued by a United States Commissioner, from turning it over to state
officers for use in a state prosecution. The Court said, however, that it was
not interfering with state matters, but merely was exercising its traditional
[Vol. 40
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Justice Frankfurter, in Lustig v. United States," decided the
same day as Wolf, contributed to legal language the "silver platter
doctrine." The Court affirmed the previously established rule
that evidence seized by state officers could be turned over on a "silver
platter" to federal agents for federal prosecution, and that such
evidence would be admissible in federal courts. The Weeks rule
would operate only if federal officers were in some way connected
with the seizure.
The silver platter doctrine was adhered to until 1960, when it
was overruled by Rios v. United States1 and Elkins v. United
States.'8 The Court there reasoned that the exclusion of state-
seized evidence in federal court would promote federalism by avoid-
ing conflicts between state and federal courts in those states which
have adopted an exclusionary rule, and that no resulting conflict
would occur in those states admitting such evidence. The Court de-
clared that it was merely exercising supervisory power over federal
court procedure and that the states could apply such sanctions against
supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies. The rule of
Stefanelli was approved during the past year in Pugach v. Dollinger, 365
U.S. 458 (1961).
In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), the Court ruled that a state
could use wiretap evidence. In so holding, the Court continued the doctrine
of Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), that mechanical devices
not connected to telephone wires are not covered by the Federal Communica-
tions Act, and affirmed the holding of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928), that the fourth amendment does not apply to wiretapping. The
constitutionality of a state statute which permitted the use of illegally ob-
tained evidence was upheld in Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court reversed the
defendant's conviction which had been secured by the use of illegal evidence.
State sheriffs had forced their way into petitioner's room, and as they entered
he put several morphine capsules into his mouth. The police jumped on him
and tried to extract the capsules; unsuccessful, they handcuffed him and
took him to a hospital where his stomach was pumped against his will. The
Court felt that this brutal conduct shocked conscience, and warned that the
states in their prosecutions must respect certain decencies of civilized con-
duct. Such outrageous conduct was held to violate the Due Process Clause.
Later, however, the Court confined the Rochin decision to its facts by de-
termining in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), that although the
placing by police of a recording device in the defendant's bedroom and listen-
ing to his conversations for over a month was "outrageous" conduct, there
had been no invasion of the defendant's physical person nor violence as in
Rochin. (It is interesting to note that in both Stefanelli and Iruine the
lone dissenter was Justice Douglas.)
1 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
'364 U.S. 253 (1960).
18364 U.S. 206 (1960) (five-to-four decision), discussed in Note, 39
N.C.L. Rv. 193 (1961).
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illegal seizures as they saw fit. But it was stated that the conduct
of a state officer would be judged against fourth amendment stand-
ards. The evidence would be inadmissible if obtained by state
officers "during a search which, if conducted by federal officers,
would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. . . ." In a
dictum the Court stated that such a standard is required because
the federal rule of exclusion is not a mere rule of evidence, but
rather a constitutional mandate which is part of the fourth amend-
ment, and part of the "right to privacy" guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. This declaration by the Court indicated their dis-
satisfaction with the double standard expressed in the Wolf decision.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, observed that even though the
majority claimed that it was in no way interfering in state matters, by
judging state officers' conduct by federal standards, their actions were
in fact regulated in so far as federal prosecutions were concerned.
In Mapp v. Ohio2" the Court affirmed the dictum of Elkins.
In holding that the states could no longer admit illegally seized
evidence, Justice Clark, author of the majority opinion, reached
this result by reasoning: (1) that the federal exclusionary rule is of
constitutional origin and is a part and parcel of the fourth amend-,
ment; (2) that in Wolf the underlying core of the fourth amend-
ment, "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police,"2 was held to be applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment; and (3) that the
exclusionary rule, therefore, logically and constitutionally, is enforce-
able against the states.
This syllogism does not seem to be altogether sound. In Wolf
it was stated that the Weeks rule was not derived from the explicit
requirements of the fourth amendment, but rather that it was an
exercise by the Court of its supervisory power over the federal court
system and that Congress might reject the rule and adopt other
methods for enforcing the guarantees of the fourth amendment.
Even assuming that the rule is of constitutional origin, this
decision is still difficult to justify. The Court has recognized and
has constantly reiterated the fact that the fourteenth amendment does
Id. at 223.
20367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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not carry the Bill of Rights as such to the states.22 Justice Frank-
furter, in Adamson v. California,2" observed:
Between the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment
into the Constitution and the beginning of the present mem-
bership of the Court-a period of seventy years-the scope
of that Amendment was passed upon by forty-three judges.
Of all these judges, only one, who may respectfully be called
an eccentric exception, ever indicated the belief that the Four-
teenth Amendment was a shorthand summary of the first
eight Amendments....
In this same case Justice Reed, pointing to the necessity of limiting
federal action only by the Bill of Rights, wrote that this position
is consistent with the doctrine of federalism, "by leaving to the states
the responsibility of dealing with the privileges and immunities of
their citizens except those inherent in national citizenship."'2 5
Since the fourth amendment does not literally apply to the
states, the Court justified its decision by reasoning that the ex-
clusionary rule is an integral and inseparable part of the "right to
privacy" which reaches the states through the fourteenth amendment
as an essential ingredient of the "concept of ordered liberty."
The "right to privacy" under the fourteenth amendment is a con-
stitutional guarantee expressed in general terms. The fourth amend-
ment on the other hand is a specific command which is accompanied
by a large body of law defining it. The Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment is a flexible concept; it has been defined by
a case by case process of inclusion and exclusion. The decision in
Mapp, therefore, seemingly amounts to rejection of this flexible
standard as far as the "right to privacy" is concerned and imposition
of the Court's configurations of the fourth amendment upon the states
via the Due Process Clause. Since the "right to privacy" is now
to be construed by employing fourth amendment standards, the
practical result is the same as if the Court had simply stated that
the fourth amendment is carried in toto to the states by the four-
teenth amendment.
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1903).
28332 U.S. 46 (1947).
" Id. at 62 (concurring opinion).
"Id. at 53.
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The majority also argued that their result was necessary because
other methods of enforcing the right of privacy in the states have
proved ineffectual, and the right is valueless without the exclusion-
ary method of enforcing it. In so saying the Court contradicts itself
and admits that the Weeks rule is a method of enforcing a consti-
tutional right and is not itself such a right. Continuing this line of
argument the Court indicated that the trend in the states since the
Weeks case has been toward adoption of its rule. The rule may or
may not be desirable; some authorities think it is illogical to the
point of absurdity." Even if the rule is a good one, this has no
bearing on the constitutional question involved. A great majority
of the states, either in their constitutions or statutes, have adopted
the fifth amendment provision against self-incrimination, but as to
those states that have provisions of lesser scope, the Court has con-
sistently refused to require literal adoption of the fifth amendment
just because it seems desirable.2 7
In an able dissent Justice Harlan pointed to the lack of tra-
ditional judicial restraint on the part of the majority. The Ohio
statute under which the defendant was convicted seemed clearly un-
constitutional in that it made criminal the mere knowing possession
or control of obscene materials.2 s The petitioner, making no refer-
ence to Wolf, advocated only the striking down of this statute. The
only mention of possible reconsideration of the Wolf case was in
the concluding paragraph of the amicus curiae brief of the American
Civil Liberties Union. Justice Harlan felt that such an important
decision should not be made without benefit of full argument.
Good or bad the decision will give rise to many problems. The
2" "Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius,
you have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer im-
prisonment for crime and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall
let you both, go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall
do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of teaching people like
Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave and inci-
dentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the
Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off some-body else who broke something else." 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4,§ 2184, at 31 n.l. (Emphasis is by the author.)
2 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Wyman v. De Gregory, 101
N.H. 171, 137 A.2d 512 (1957), appeal dismissed, 360 U.S. 717 (1959), re-
hearing denied, 361 U.S. 857 (1959); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 79(1908).
28 The statute provides: "No person shall knowingly . . . have in his
possession or under his control an obscene lewd, or lascivious book . .. 2.,
OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1961).
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issue of admissibility of illegally state-seized evidence has appeared
on the average of fifteen times per term during the past three
Supreme Court terms alone; as a result the question of the retro-
activity of Mapp will be of major concern in the twenty-four states
that have no exclusionary rule, and in those states which have only
partially adopted the rule.9 North Carolina has adopted the Weeks
rule,"0 but under Elkins and Mapp. in determining whether an
officer's conduct was proper, apparently a federal standard will be
applied.
Justice Black, concurring in the Mapp decision, reversed his
previous position in Wolf where he stated that although he felt
the fourth amendment was enforceable against the states, the ex-
clusionary rule is a rule of evidence only. He justified his present
position by seizing upon the Boyd case for the proposition that
there is a close interrelation between the fourth and fifth amendments
and that introducing illegal evidence is the same as compelling a
person to testify against himself. Thus by applying both amend-
ments to the states the exclusionary rule becomes constitutionally
mandatory.
Justice Harlan indicated the fallacy of this argument. As re-
cently as April 1961, in Cohen v. Hurley,"' the Court once again
rejected the position that the fifth amendment is a limitation on other
than federal action. If the fifth amendment alone does not bind state
action, it logically follows that-the fourth and the fifth together
similarly would not do so.
Justice Black's view that both the fourth and fifth amendments
apply directly to the states would seem to go even farther than
that of the majority, in that they attempted to justify the decision
on the basis of the "right to privacy" under the fourteenth amend-
ment. In effect, however, the majority closely approaches Justice
Black's view because, as previously pointed out, it makes little
difference whether it is said that the fourth amendment as such
applies to the states, or that this "right to privacy" under the
fourteenth amendment will be construed in the light of fourth amend-
ment standards. The end result is the same.
2 For a list of those states which had or had not adopted an exclusionary
rule as of 1960, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1960)(Appendix to Opinion -of the Court, Table I).
'
0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953); N.C. GN. STAT. § 15-27.1 (Supp.
1959).31366 U.S. 117 (1961).
19621
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Having taken the first step in determining a state citizen's rights
under the fourteenth amendment by employing one of the Bill of
Rights as the standard, the Court, following this theory to its logical
end, could ultimately make binding upon the states all of the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights. This could occur despite the fact that
it has been consistently held that the right to indictment by a grand
jury,"2 and the prohibitions against double jeopardy 3 and com-
pulsory self-incrimination 4 under the fifth amendment apply only
to federal prosecutions. Similarly under the sixth amendment the
provisions for a speedy 5 and public trial by jury,"0 and the right to
counsel37 in criminal proceedings apply to federal courts only. Now
that the decision in Mapp has opened the door to the enforcement
of provisions of this genus against the states, it is not impossible,
though admittedly unlikely in the immediate future, that federal
standards ultimately will control criminal procedure in the states.
It is submitted that the Court's new policy of supervising state
law enforcement is an unwise one. The great preponderance of the
law enforcement burden lies with the several states. Each state may
have peculiar crime problems. The people in those states make
the laws that govern their police and their courts; they live under
those laws. It is their constitutional right to make such laws, and
they alone should determine what evidence should or should not be
admissible. The Supreme Court of the United States should not
legislate local public policy.
LORAN A. JOHNSON
32 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Martinez v. Southern
Ute Tribe, 151 F. Supp. 476 (D.C. Colo. 1957), aff'd, 249 F.2d 915 (10th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958), rehearing denied, 357 U.S.
924 (1958).
" See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), rehearing denied, 360
U.S. 907 (1959); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
8 See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); United States ex rel.
Rooney v. Ragen, 173 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 961
(1949); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Wyman v. De
Gegory, 101 N.H. 171, 137 A.2d 512 (1957), appeal dismissed, 360 U.S.
717 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 857 (1959).
" Ex parte Whistler, 65 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1945), appeal dismissed,
154 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 797 (1946), rehearing
denied, 327 U.S. 819 (1948).
3 New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
8 1Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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